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US – China Competition in Asia Pacific Region 








China’s initiation of the New Silk Road plan in late 2013 has a potentially huge impact 
on global development. The purpose of this thesis is to understand, the impacts of the China-
led on the global financial system.  
This paper highlights key issues related to finances and governance at the AIIB. The 
paper focuses on China’s Silk Road Economic Belt framework and on how China’s efforts to 
increase its economic integration in Asia Pacific Region.  
The “One Belt and One Road” program is China’s major strategic measure in response 
to the emerging trends in economic globalization, with the objectives of increasing 
convergence between nations and constructing a new open economic system. 
To make this argument, I will focus on the China’s high-speed rail investment around 
the world and examine available evidence to make a case for a paradigm change in global 
financing development system. I argue that China is establishing a new international financial 
architecture, which is shifting the regional economic order and fundamentally changing 












Since Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed the establishment of an Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) during his trip to Southeast Asia in October 2013, 
China has dedicated significant political, economic and diplomatic efforts toward paving the 
way for a successful new financial institution. China has made the AIIB a priority and has 
pushed for its successful debut by rallying regional support, broadening the membership base, 
and refining the bank’s role.
1
 
These efforts led to the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on AIIB’s 
establishment by 21 Asian countries in October 2014 as well as applications by 57 other 
countries to become founding members of the bank before the deadline of March 31, 2015. 
After five rounds of intensive negotiations, 57 countries signed the Articles of Agreement 
(AOA) for the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank on June 29, 2015 in Beijing.
2 
The new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) will boost investment in the 
region while contributing to “fairer” global economic governance, Chinese President Xi 
Jinping said on Jan 16 at the formal opening ceremony in Beijing.
3
 The China-backed 
                                           
1
 Website DW Institution, “China officially launches new development bank AIIB”, Last accessed Jan 17, 2016. 
http://www.dw.com/en/china-officially-launches-new-development-bank-aiib/a-18985025,  
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 Yun Sun, “China and the Evolving Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank”, Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA, 
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AIIB — which includes major economies such as Australia and South Korea but notably 




Beijing will be by far the largest AIIB shareholder with about a 30% stake, according 
to the legal framework signed by founding member countries. With authorized capital of 
$100 billion, it expects to offer its first batch of project loans later this year 2016.
5
 
This thesis analyzes the dynamics influencing the international system. This paper’s 
research questions are two – fold. 
First, what does china hope to gain from establishing the AIIB? 
Second, how does the AIIB change China’s place in geopolitics? Does the AIIB 
represent a fundamental challenge to the new existing international multilateral order? 
Beijing has already sought to expand its influence through Xi's signature foreign 
policy initiative, known as “One Belt One Road”(OBOR), a massive investment scheme 
that aims to increase China's role in central Asia and in Europe through loans that build 
infrastructure and transport networks. Touted as a revival of ancient Silk Road trade routes, 
the initiative underscores China's ambition to wield increased geopolitical power. 
China has had multiple aims in establishing AIIB. The most important (and arguably 
                                           
4
 Yun sun., p. 27. 
5
 rt.com Institution, “China-led AIIB development bank officially launched, elects first president”, Last 
accessed Jan 16, 2016. https://www.rt.com/business/329208-china-aiib-development-bank/, The Board of 
Governors of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) has held its inaugural meeting, declaring the 




altruistic) one has been to help meet East Asia’s need for increased infrastructure 
development funds. In addition, AIIB represents part of China’s effort to “democratize” the 
international order, and has been described as Beijing’s “first serious challenge to the U.S.-
led global economic order established at Bretton Woods 70 years ago.” Perhaps most 
importantly, AIIB could have important strategic implications for China’s relations with 
countries in the region. 
China’s goals in forming AIIB are not free of internal inconsistencies and external 
controversies. Indeed, since China’s initial announcement to establish the bank, the AIIB has 
raised many questions, touched on many sensitive issues and led to serious policy debates in 
and outside China. For example, there is an intrinsic tension between China’s ambitious 
claims that AIIB will provide funding for necessary infrastructure projects — some of which 
may be financially risky— and the bank’s identity as a multilateral development bank.
6
 
With China the largest shareholder in AIIB and Beijing clearly pursuing some of its 
national interests through the bank, questions have also been raised about the extent to which 
AIIB’s decision-making process and operations will be truly multilateral. The negotiation 
process that led to the AOA made China keenly aware of the incompatibility of some of its 
goals, in turn leading Beijing to adjust its expectations in key areas. The unexpected embrace 
of the bank by developed European countries, for example, created an opportunity to move 
AIIB toward prevailing international norms and standards.
7
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As a result, the AIIB reflected in the AOA today is quite different from the AIIB China 
envisioned before March 2015. In this sense, the evolution of AIIB may provide a model of 
how China’s behavior can be shaped by the collective efforts of the international community 
and how China’s ambitions can be accommodated without overturning the existing 
international order. 
In sum, China has set out on a path to become a global super power and to achieve this 
objective it needs considerable leverage on the developing economies in Asia (and rest of the 
world). One of the ways to achieve this influence is by funding development projects in the 
nations with which it has trade ties or with which it wants to improve trade ties. A 
development bank with China being the major share holder will give China a great tool 
through which it can fund projects of its trade partners. 
1.2 Significance of the AIIB 
How significant is China’s challenge? Many view the AIIB as competition for existing 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs). As such the AIIB now also stands to divide the 
United States, Japan, and other Western countries. The most significant outcome of this 
ordeal is that the international community is finally,  
“…rejecting the United States’ obsession with being number one. Multilateralism 
is in vogue and in looking askance at the AIIB and China’s efforts to assume global 
responsibility, the United States screwed up. It lost an opportunity for voting rights 
in the new bank and continued economic influence in the region, but more 






This paper highlights key issues related to finances and governance at the AIIB. I focus 
on China’s Silk Road Economic Belt framework and the country’s efforts to increase 
economic integration in Asia Pacific Region. 
Within such a strategic framework, China proposes a new approach to promoting 
worldwide economic prosperity and to benefiting other regions in terms of driving forward 
cross-regional economic integration through economic growth in China and Asia. 
From a regional integration perspective, I argue that The One Belt, One Road 
initiative offers considerable potential in several economic, political, cultural, and strategic 
realms. Specifically, there will be new opportunities for China’s outbound investment and 
demanded improvements in infrastructure access and interconnection with China’s 
neighboring countries. 
I argue that Beijing is challenging the current global financial architecture. It is 
reshaping an international norm, rules and institutions. The AIIB shifts the balance of 
economic power. China’s economic presence in Africa, Latin America and Europe  
challenges the long-standing economic primacy of the United States.  
Existing work provides ways to understand the current situation. Historically, 
hegemonic stability theory said that the (neoliberal) international economic order relies on the 
                                           






leadership of a dominant economic power (the US). On this theoretical foundation, the rise of 
the China—along with the purported decline of U.S. hegemony—might be seen as the 
unraveling of the global economic order. BRIC economies rely to a large extent on state 
intervention, their governments are far less concerned with promoting democracy and 
liberalism internationally and are, in some cases, creating institutions that actively challenge 
the ‘Washington Consensus.’ 
Figure 1.1 
 
This thesis departs from the HST tradition. It analyzes regionalism, which is more 
appropriate for understanding china’s recent organizational initiatives, postwar U.S. policies 
toward regional institutions, the role of U.S. allies and partners, and current U.S. goals. 
Recent economic and security developments threaten to fragment Asia’s institutional 
landscape, erode regional stability, and undermine Asian confidence in the legitimacy of the 




that HST cannot fully explain. 
“Rival regionalisms”
9
— new or re-energized regional groupings initiated or heavily 
supported by China and Russia—are on the rise. Their goals include providing alternatives to 
U.S.-led institutions, thereby avoiding Western-backed conditionality and reducing U.S. 
influence. As a result, a slow crisis both of regional and global order and of institutional 
legitimacy is emerging. 
Figure 1.2 
 
Source: World Institute 
The Obama administration’s efforts led a number of countries to hold back from 
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 Ellen L. Frost, “rival regionalisms and regional order A Slow Crisis of Legitimacy”, NBR special report #48 | 
Dec 2014. “Rival Regionalisms.” These regionalisms take the form of new or revitalized regional groupings led 
by governments that are cool or even hostile to the United States. Such initiatives are designed to provide 




signing on the AIIB.
10
 The decision by the UK, and subsequently, France, Germany, and 
Italy, to participate is therefore significant not only because they will be major shareholders, 




China seeks to leverage this new Pan-Asianism
12
 as its foreign and economic policies 
converge in unprecedented ways. Beijing has pledged significant sums of money, leveraging 
state-backed financial vehicles for diplomatic and economic ends. But Beijing has more than 
just capital. Surrounded by rivals, it also benefits from very favorable economic geography.
13
 
The US’s concern is that other countries may look China as an alternative for economic 
leadership. It is seen as a China increase “soft power”
14
 in the region.  
1.3 Summary 
This thesis argues (and founds) that China could uses AIIB as an instrument for 
realizing its major foreign policy objectives, which include: (i) political stability; (ii) 
sovereign security, territorial integrity and national unification; and (iii) sustainable economic 
and social development. In pursuing these objectives from the 1990s until recently, China 
abided by Deng Xiaoping’s famous approach on foreign policy: keep a low profile and 
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 Mercy A. Kuo & Angelica O. Tang, “China’s AIIB and the US Reputation Risk”, Last accessed Apr 16, 2015. 
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Over the last several years, however, Deng’s approach has been replaced by a more 
confident and assertive posture. China now seeks to establish a new type of great power 
relations with the United States. I aggressively claim territories in the South and East China 
Seas; it attempts to connect China with Europe through two Silk Roads; and it leads 
initiatives to create new international financial institutions, such as AIIB.
15
 
I also find that the strategic use of economic incentives to pursue ‘One Belt, One Road’ 
will assist China in fulfilling its foreign policy objectives of improving diplomatic relations 
with its Asian neighbors and expanding its regional and global influence. The ‘One Belt, One 
Road’ initiative highlights China’s ability to use its enormous financial resources for 
infrastructure investment in Asian neighbors, including cooperation with Beijing. If 
successful, the initiative will deepen economic integration by boosting cross border trade, 
investment and financial flows. It provides economic benefits for both China and other 
countries that use or form part of the new transport systems. Thus, the initiative will 
strengthen China’s importance as an economic partner for its neighbors and enhance Beijing’s 
diplomatic leverage in the region. Greater investment in energy and mineral resources, 
particularly in Central Asia, could also help strengthen China’s energy and resource security. 
Beyond the pursuit of geo-economic interests, China may also use AIIB as an 
instrument to realize its own geopolitical objectives, including expanding its sphere of 
political influence. Potential adversaries surround China, with Japan in the east (and the U.S. 
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 Masahiro Kawai, “Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in the Evolving International Financial Order”, 




beyond it), the Philippines and Vietnam in the southeast and India in the south. Thus, China 
seeks closer ties with Central Asian countries through overland routes and with friendly 
Southeast Asian, South Asian and Middle Eastern countries through maritime routes. China 
may use AIIB in addition to the Silk Road Fund and even the BRICS’ New Development 
Bank to expand its geopolitical influence.
16
 
Although Beijing has not yet imposed any preconditions, special commitments or 
requirements on the Silk Road nations with which it works, some nations believe that China 
has significant political, security and military motives underlying the initiative.
17
 
I conclude that China’s desire to make the Yuan the world’s top currency, potentially 
eclipses the dollar. It is rarely recognized that such a role would require a dramatic change in 
China’s relationship with the rest of the global economy.
18
 Rather than importing foreign 
currency by running trade surpluses and absorbing foreign capital, China would need to 
become a currency exporter, supplying Yuan to the world either by running trade deficits or 
channeling its own capital abroad. This means turning China’s own development model on its 
head, something it’s not clear the Chinese have seriously wrapped their minds around.
19
 
The years since the 2007–2008 financial crises, however, have seen more demand for 
transformative change than has been the norm, and more debate between major economies 
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 Kawai, p 14. 
17
 Silvercrest.com Institution,“Rivaling the World Bank and Asian Development Bank”, Last accessed Oct 9, 




 CSFP, “Parallel Structures Challenge the Established International Order”, China’s Shadow Foreign Policy, 
Current challenges to the post-cold war order such as the Ukraine crisis and the protracted reform blockades in 




about the nature of those changes.
20
 The US and China, as the world’s two largest economies, 
are at the center of these developments. One way or another, these two countries are 












                                           




Ⅱ. Literature and Background on the AIIB? 
: Motivations behind the AIIB and China's Goals? 
 
The AIIB links Europe and Asia through three developmental banks. They have 
emerged outside the post-war Bretton Woods framework, and are changing the global 
geopolitical architecture. China is the linchpin of the evolving world financial architecture. It 
led the launch of the AIIB.  
Here, I discuss the formation of the bank, China’s goals, and some of the 
implications the AIIB’s creation has for tradition economic and political relationships. For 
example, I note that the run up to the formation of the bank opened cracks within the Atlantic 
Alliance. Despite U.S. objections, European countries including Britain, France and Germany 
joined the AIIB. Australia and South Korea top U.S. allies in the Asia-Pacific — also decided 
to participate in the development bank as its founding members.
21
  
This chapter analyzes “why china built to the AIIB, and will focus on China’s foreign 
policy objectives.  
2.1 Financing Regional Infrastructure Development 
President XiJinping has launched a new international development bank, marking a 
milestone in the reform of global economic governance system. The AIIB will boost 
investment in the region while contributing to fairer global economic governance, Xi said on 
Jan 16 at the formal opening ceremony in Beijing. 
                                           




“Asia’s financing needs for basic infrastructure are absolutely enormous,” 
adding that the new bank will seek to invest in projects that are “high-quality, 
low-cost.” “The funding and inauguration of the AIIB will effectively boost 
investment to support infrastructure development in Asia. It will serve to 
channel more resources, particularly private investment, into infrastructure 
projects,” “the AIIB becomes a truly international, rule-based and high 
standard institution in all aspects, involving its governance structure, 




 China pledged to put up most of the bank’s US$50 billion in capital and said the total 
will rise as high as US$100 billion. Also, Xi unveiled an extra US$50 million fund for 
infrastructure projects in less-developed countries. The AIIB, which is expected to start 
operations in the second quarter, is expected to lend between US$10 billion and US$15 
billion a year for the first five or six years. 
“We already have a very good pipeline of co-financing projects (with other 
international development banks) and standalone projects,” adding that while 
loans will be made in US dollars, the bank may raise capital in other 
currencies, including the euro and Yuan. “Asia faces severe connectivity gaps 
and significant infrastructure bottlenecks. It is critical to address these needs, 
because good infrastructure is a foundation for robust economic growth, and 
expand economic opportunities and improve the quality of life for everybody,” 




Asia has a massive infrastructure development gap. Rapid development and 
urbanization is expected to move 44 million to people to the cities every year from 2009-
2050 according to the UN.
24
 Financing this infrastructure deficit is beyond the resources of 
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 LAROUCHE PAC institution, “President Xi Jinping Addresses Official Opening of AIIB”, Last accessed Jan 
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 World Bank, “Anemic recovery in emerging markets to weigh heavily on global growth in 2016”, Last 





the individual governments and therefore international support is highly important. The ADB 
has a capital base of just over $160 billion while the World Bank has $223 billion. Adding 
the additional $50 billion from the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, it is still a very 
significant gap to fill.
25
  
The World Bank previously failed to resolve these problems, sometimes complicating 
them further. In the post-Washington Consensus shift in 1997, heavily emphasis was placed 
on the importance of appropriate institutions for growth China has pointed to the funding 
shortage for infrastructure development in Asia as its primary motivation for founding AIIB. 
The World Bank estimates a $1 trillion infrastructure shortfall in low- and middle-income 
countries, and suggests that the demand for infrastructure will continue to grow as countries 
develop. According to a more Asia-specific report by ADB in 2009, between 2010 and 
2020,
26
 Asia will need to invest $8 trillion in national infrastructure and an additional $290 
billion in regional infrastructure projects in transport and energy. Indeed, AIIB will provide 
increased funding for infrastructure in such areas as energy, telecommunications and 




2.2 Reform of the Existing International Financial Institutions 
The AIIB will challenge the World Bank and IMF led by US and other OECD 
members. As the largest power in both organizations, the US wants to maintain its controlling 
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position, while China, the fast-growing economic over the last decade, wants to set up a new 
rule for world economy. To do so, China is looking beyond existing Bretton Woods 
institutions.  
On the other hand, China faces a recession in the future: markets have been volatile in 
early 2016. As a result, the government tries to invest the surplus in last few years to boom 
the economy by investing in infrastructure. In either case, a still-growing Chinese economy 
will be a great challenge to America.
28
 
Figure 2.1:  
 
Source: AIIB http://www.aiib.org/ 
China has led the initiative for the AIIB despite the existence of the other similar 
institutions like World Bank and ADB.
29
 Their funding alone is not enough to cover 
infrastructure projects in Asia. But while the funding gap is the original impetus for the AIIB, 
                                           
28 Ernest H. Preeg, “The Decline of U.S. Export Competitiveness for Manufactures And Its Consequences for the World 
Economic Order”, Policy Analysis , Apr 2015, p. 1-3. since 2000 the U.S. share of global exports of manufactures has 
declined sharply, from 18% in 2000 to 12% in 2013, while the Chinese share almost quadrupled, from 6% to 23%, and the 
EU share (in trade with non-members) was down only slightly, from 21% to 20%.,  





China and AIIB supporters are also motivated by frustration with the ‘politics’ that go into 
secure funding through the ADB and World Bank. 
The US retains 16.75% of the votes in the IMF, while China holds only 3.81%. As a 
Financial Times article explains, the IMF’s, 
 “quota system, which determines what each country pays in and how many 
votes they are given, fails to reflect the reality of a changing world. The 
BRICS nations, which account for more than a fifth of global output, have a 
quota of just 10.3%. European countries, by contrast, are allocated 27.5% for 
18% of output. To add insult to injury, the IMF presidency is reserved for a 




As Brookings Scholar David Dollar explains, China is “frustrated with the lack of 
governance reform, slow pace of project implementation and reluctance to expand lending on 
the part of the existing development banks [and thus is] starting its own.” Since announcing 
its plan to establish AIIB, Beijing has had to address how the new bank will handle 
relationships with existing multilateral development banks (MDBs). Most Chinese officials 
and analysts have downplayed competition, instead emphasizing the potential for mutually 
complementary relationships among AIIB, the World Bank and ADB. Highlighting 
complementarities, however, fails to address the reality of the market for infrastructure 
finance. While the demand is large enough to accommodate all three banks, the competition 
for good quality projects is steep.
31
 
Thus there is an important role for the AIIB to play in the development of Asia (and the 
rest of the world). There is some skepticism surrounding the organization. However, the issue 
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 Yun Sun, p. 31. 
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at the heart of this project is how the AIIB promotes Chinese interests, and affects the 
distribution of global economic power. China is developing its own, alternative institutions 
for ordering the world, which will ultimately rival or even displace U.S.-dominated 
institutions. 
2.3 Foreign Policy Objectives 
Henry Kissinger anticipated China’s initiative to create the first new international 
organization of the 21st century. He didn’t foresee the AIIB as such, but argued that as China 
continued to increase its global economic weight, it would inevitably seek its security, in part, 
by building international organizations in which it sat at the center. This would — rightly or 







“China and other major developing economies have long expressed their 
dissatisfaction with US and European dominated international institutions 
created at the end of WWII. China’s efforts to increase its contributions and 
hence voting power in the IMF, for instance, have been stalled for years in the 
US Congress. The reservation of the top job in each of the World Bank and 
the IMF for citizens of the US and EU, respectively, is offensive. The deal 
between the two that has stuck for over sixty years smacks of a global 
Tammany Hall racket. That China would build its own international bodies, 
and will continue to do so, shouldn’t be a surprise”.  
The true significance is more political. AIIB is China's project; it is the first major 
international monetary organization to be formed without the American leadership since 
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 Henry Kissinger, World Order, a member of Penguin Group (USA) LLC, 2014, Published in Penguin Books 
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WWII. It tells the world that China is now officially an economic superpower with influence 
and prestige on par with the US.  
China’s official answer is that Asia has a massive infrastructure funding gap. The AIIB 
will start with $50 billion in capital not enough for what is needed but still a helpful boost. 
Moreover, while ADB and World Bank loans support everything from environmental 
protection to gender equality, the AIIB will concentrate its firepower on infrastructure. 
Officially at least, ADB and World Bank officials have extended a cautious welcome to the 
new China-led bank, saying they see room for collaboration.
34
 
However, unstated tensions stems from a deeper shift: China will use the new bank to 
expand its influence at the expense of America and Japan, Asia's established powers. China’s 
decision to fund a new multilateral bank rather than give more to existing ones reflects its 
exasperation with the glacial pace of global economic governance reform. The same 
motivation lies behind the New Development Bank established by the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, 
India, China and South Africa). Although China is the biggest economy in Asia, the ADB is 
dominated by Japan; Japan’s voting share is more than twice China’s and the bank’s 
president has always been Japanese. Reforms to give China a little more say at the IMF have 
been delayed for years, and even if they go through America will still retain far more power. 
China is, understandably, impatient for change.
35
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2.4 Internationalization of the Chinese Yuan 
China sees the status of the U.S. dollar as the main reserve currency in international 
trade and finance as the basis for American “financial hegemony,” which hinders the 
expansion of Chinese economic influence. The internationalization of the Yuan is part of 
China’s broader strategic goal of democratizing the global order, which requires, in part, a 
decrease in the dollar’s influence.
36
  
Since 2009, China has actively sought to internationalize the Yuan, largely by 
establishing the so-called “dim sum bond market” and the Cross-Border Trade Yuan 
Settlement Pilot Project, which established pools of offshore Yuan liquidity. China hopes 
AIIB will strengthen these efforts through increased and diversified channels. Most important, 
infrastructure development financing by AIIB could popularize the Yuan as a traded currency, 
thereby boosting its position. 
Economists are saying that
37
 Asia needs $8 trillion in infrastructure (i.e., roads, power, 
electricity, communication) investment. Infrastructure projects typically get higher leverage 
because they have real physical assets to back. With $100 billion initial capitalization, AIIB 
can get $1 trillion through issuance of AAA bonds. The countries that are part of the founding 
members of AIIB will get favorable treatment on the related construction and service 
contracts. That means they get a slice of the $1 trillion cash flow.  
In addition, each European country has its own reason as well. Britain has been 
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courting China since 2013 in a bid to make UK the largest destination in Europe for Chinese 
investment. In addition, China is pushing to have Yuan in the basket of reserve currency, and 
which place is better than London to issue the first Yuan-denominated bond.  
Many of the other people have already listed many valid economic reasons for 
AIIB.  IMF and World Bank has been leaving money on the table in Asia by not financing 
developing Asian countries aggressively, and China is leading the efforts to meet this demand 
because it can. 
US also concerned about the growing threat of the Chinese Yuan
38
 as a global currency 
which can dent the dollar’s hegemony. US dollar maintains its natural value over time due to 
its status as the world's reserve currency. Demand for the dollar as a reserve currency allows 
the US to avoid depreciation. Thus, the US fears AIIB creation because it risks losing 
influence in Asia generally, but also because it might lead to a devaluation of the dollar as the 
AIIB and China grow. 
In short, china attracting investors from all over the world while gradually enhancing 
its impact on global economy, making developing countries more reliant on Chinese currency 
Yuan as a counterpart of the US dollar of the post Bretton Woods System. China is seeking 
for more allies and worldwide cooperation to strengthen its power.  
Eastern Europe is an example of how the world has changed. Ten years ago, those 
countries would have been looking for investors from Western Europe; they are now 
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widening their portfolio and that includes China.  
Yet, the move is likely to channelize China’s foreign exchange reserves, which have so 
far been mainly siphoned into low-yielding U.S. treasury bonds. The AIIB also elected a 12-
member board of directors, which would steer operations. Far from being a rival, the NDB of 
BRICS grouping is also set to work closely with the AIIB. Mr. Sharma told resident Indian 
media that “formal and informal” channels of communication for coordination had been 
established between the AIIB and the New Development Bank of the BRICS.
39
 
2.5 Domestic Economic Needs 
After 30 years of double-digit GDP growth rates, China’s growth decelerated due to the 
global financial crisis of 2008. Indeed, China attempted to maintain high growth in the face 
of that crisis by raising public investment spending by CNY4 trillion and easing monetary 
policy. While China achieved its goals through 2011, growth rates have since fallen to 7-8%, 
due to domestic over-investment, excess credit, excess capacity and a shrinking labor force, 
coupled with stagnant economic conditions in developed economies. Excess capacity has 
become massive even by Chinese standards, particularly in materials-producing sectors, such 
as steel and cement. Financial vulnerabilities have also risen due to large borrowing by local 
governments, housing bubbles and the spread of shadow banking.
40
 
China admits that it has entered a “new normal,” with permanently slower growth rates 
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of 7-8%, which will require structural reforms to be maintained. A slowdown in China’s 
infrastructure and property investment, which the Xi administration has pursued, would 
further aggravate the country’s already low capacity utilization. Significantly, stimulating 
aggregate demand would also go against Xi’s structural reform efforts. 
In this context, expanding external demand through AIIB’s operations, rather than a 
cheap Yuan, could be a useful way to support market-oriented reform of the Chinese economy. 
Infrastructure projects in AIIB member countries could provide them economic stimulus 
sufficient to offer export opportunities for manufacturing firms struggling with excess 
capacity. Similarly, infrastructure firms facing shrinking domestic opportunities could expand 
their activity abroad. 
Conclusion 
This chapter explained the reasons behind the creation of the AIIB. My main argument 
is that the AIIB will likely challenge the World Bank and IMF, led primarily by the US.  
China, which has experienced rapid growth, faces a recession in the future. As a result, 
the government tries to invest the surplus in last few years to boom the economy by investing 
in infrastructure. Thus, the Chinese are starting to develop their own, alternative institutions 







Ⅲ. Potential “One Belt, One Road” Initiative 
 : What is the impact of the AIIB,Today? 
 
President Xi Jinping first presented China’s vision for a “Silk Road Economic Belt” 
during a 2013 speech in Kazakhstan. The idea was to “forge closer economic ties, deepen 
cooperation, and expand development in the Euro-Asia region”.
41
 The new Asian bank is one 
part of an ambitious Chinese push to create a new generation of financial and economic 
institutions that could give it greater political influence in the Asia-pacific region and 
potentially in other parts of the world. The shape of the global economy shifts, elevating the 
relative importance of China and other emerging markets, the US has, in the past year, missed 
several chances to seal its economic strength for the century ahead. 
In this chapter, the main objective is to understand that the AIIB will become a 
multilateral development bank that finances programs addressing huge infrastructure deficits 
in Asia, EU and Middle East. Infrastructure development is also integral to a shared vision of 
integration of the region’s economies to be an engine of global growth.  
Moreover, I identify how China is becoming an economic superpower. Finally I will 
point out that what it means to compete with the US-China on a political and economic level 
in Asia-Pacific Region. 
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3.1 OBOR Initiative 
In early 2015, the contours of Beijing’s strategy began to emerge as China’s leadership 
laid out plans for this “Silk Road Economic Belt” through Central Asia, and a “21st Century 
Maritime Silk Road” through Southeast and South Asia. China referred to both collectively as 
“One Belt, One Road” (OBOR). Both are portrayed as an opportunity to reshape the 
economic and political order in Central Asia and the Asian Pacific region by promoting a 
network of trade routes, political cooperation, and cultural exchange. By so doing, China 
intends to place its sometimes-restive western and interior provinces at the heart of its 
engagement with Central and South Asia in an effort to accelerate development and promote 
stability.
42 
Beijing characterizes its initiatives as an effort to encourage integration and economic 
growth in Eurasia, rather than an attempt to expand its own political influence in the region. 
Chinese policy makers describe OBOR as a mechanism to promote peace and stability in the 
by strengthening China’s bilateral relations with its neighbors and developing international 
organizations that are not dominated by Western powers.  
The “One Belt, One Road” initiative hangs on four interrelated objectives: Improving 
regional infrastructure, increasing regional economic policy coordination, removing barriers  
to trade, and encouraging cultural ties to build support for the broader project. The blueprint 
lays out a set of transportation, energy, and telecommunication infrastructure projects, 
coupled with plans for increased regional diplomatic coordination, financial integration, and 
                                           




cultural exchange.  
President Xi stated that China hopes its annual trade with countries involved will 
exceed $2.5 trillion in roughly a decade. China’s trade with the Central Asian region has 
grown dramatically in recent years, from roughly $1 billion in 2000 to over $50 billion in 
2013. In July 2015, The Chinese Ministry of Commerce announced that in the first half of the 
year Chinese companies signed 1,401 contracts for projects in countries included in the 
OBOR framework. These contracts were said to be worth $37.6 billion (an increase of 16.7% 
year on year) and equal to 43.3% of all overseas contracts signed during that period.
43
 




The AIIB is a financial institution proposed by China to make way for investment in 
infrastructure in the Asian region. Bank is in consonance with China’s OBOR initiative.  
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Considering China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative and India’s ‘Spice Route’ and 
‘Mausam’ project, the need for massive demand for infrastructure funding becomes all the 
more evident. These projects will not only improve the collective GDP;s of the respective 
economies but produce employment opportunities, improve relations among the countries by 
boosting trade among them, facilitate technology transfer and finally enmesh the countries 
into the idea of globalization. 
 Foreign Minister Wang Yi states that
44
 the OBOR was not a “tool of geopolitics”. In 
a nod to Western critics’ fears about China’s real intentions, he said the project should not be 
viewed through an “out-dated Cold War mentality”. China’s Vice Foreign Minister, Zhang 
Yesui, echoed this message of reassurance at the China Development Forum later in March. 
He presented China as a satisfied power, fully integrated into the international system. Zhang 
said that China’s OBOR is “not directed against any specific country or organization” but is a 
“useful complement” to existing international and regional institutions.
45
 
Indirectly criticizing the US as a traditional power, Chinese officials and academics 
repeatedly stress than the OBOR is not like the Marshall Plan. Wang Yi states that comparing 
the OBOR to the Marshall Plan is like comparing “apples and oranges.” The OBOR is based 
on “open cooperation”– which implicitly means that the Marshall Plan was not.
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However, the new Silk Road is also link to India, the Middle East, and to Europe. It is 
not just an effort to integrate East Asia. Expending further west presents core challenges. The 
OBOR is the largest coordinated infrastructure investment program in the world. According 
to current plan, Eurasia will be united infrastructural into a functional “mega-continent.”  At 
the center is the AIIB, whose investments will accelerate this trend. 
The Silk Road Economic Belt—OBOR’s land-based component—encompasses several 
economic corridors around China’s western rim, creating a grid of transportation routes rather 
than a single linear path. The belt project envisions the construction of new rail lines, 
highways, pipelines for oil and gas, telecommunications infrastructure, and fiber-optic cables. 
Two corridors will extend across the Eurasian landmass at different latitudes and terminate in 
Europe, while another will connect China’s southwestern provinces with mainland Southeast 
Asia. The proposed China-Pakistan and Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar economic 




While the Chinese government has couched the initiative in altruistic terms, OBOR is 
chiefly designed to benefit China’s economy. Most importantly, China seeks to spur 
economic development in its poorer western and southern regions, which lag far behind the 
prosperous coastal provinces. Whether China might eventually push for a free trade zone that 
covers OBOR countries in response to the recently concluded Trans-Pacific Partnership 
                                           




agreement is an important question.
48
  
Geostrategic motivations also drive the OBOR initiative, with the overarching one 
being the desire to circumvent U.S. encirclement in the Western Pacific. U.S. political and 
military influence in the regions west of China is considerably weaker than around China’s 
eastern rim, giving Beijing incentive to “go west” as Washington rebalances to the Asia-
Pacific. The construction of new pipelines linking China with hydrocarbon-rich Central Asian 
states and the transport of Middle Eastern oil through Pakistan
49
 instead of the South China 
Sea will improve Chinese energy security. Currently, more than 70% of China’s oil imports 
from the Middle East and Africa pass through the Strait of Malacca—a chokepoint between 
the Malay Peninsula and Sumatra that is vulnerable to a U.S. blockade. A further geostrategic 
motivation is focused on soft power: China hopes to win the goodwill of OBOR nations by 
providing billions of dollars in financing for infrastructure projects that will likely benefit 
their economies. 
The One Belt, One Road initiative offers considerable potential in several economic, 
political, cultural, and strategic realms. There will be new opportunities for China’s outbound 
investment and infrastructure access as well as greater interconnection between China’s 
neighboring countries. 
3.2  AIIB and Brics NDB 
China’s rise and the deepening integration of the emerging countries, especially the 
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BRICS group into the global economy have been two of the most noticeable shifts at global 
level after the 1990s. However, the aftermath of the financial and economic crisis apex 
underscored many vulnerabilities, imbalances, uncertainties and risks, pointing out that 
economies worldwide are unlikely to come back to growth rates similar to those preceding 
the crisis and also that there is an urgent need for change, both internally and in the 
architecture of the institutions governing the world economy.
50
 
The New Development Bank (NDB) was the first new Chinese-led institution to come 
online. It was established in July 2014 by Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa at 




The NDB is structured to heavily favor the founding BRICS members, and any 
contributions from new members may not reduce the BRICS’ voting shares below 55% (or 
increase the new members’ shares beyond 7% of the total voting shares). The protected 
dominance in voting shares, along with a requirement that the president and vice president 
hail from BRICS countries, are likely to discourage other large economies from joining. 
While the BRICS claim that they are aiming for a more inclusive governance structure 
compared to existing institutions, their the design of the institution belie these claims.
52
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In contrast, the AIIB is more open, with 57 founding members, compared to five for 
the BRICS bank. AIIB’s Articles of Agreement specify an open procurement policy, which 
means non-AIIB members can provide goods and services for AIIB-funded projects. 
However, China will be the largest shareholder and host the headquarters of the AIIB. 
Emerging powers
53
 have criticized existing international institutions for not 
representing the actual division of power in the contemporary world. In the last decade, the 
global balance of power has changed significantly; a fundamental shift towards a multipolar 
world has been taking place. This shift is predominantly towards Asia and there has been a 
significant increase of South-South cooperation.  
A recent Chinese initiative, the AIIB, could have an impact on the NDB. Moscow 
denies that the AIIB’s role would overlap with that of the NDB, but it understands that both 
banks are China-centered and their interaction would depend to a degree on Chinese priorities. 
Attempts to combine these financial projects appear aimed at increasing their collective role 
and influence in the global financial system vis-à-vis the IMF and World Bank.  
Why does India join in China-led AIIB? First of all, because India needs infrastructure 
and financing, and China has money to invest. It's a perfect fit. Secondly, both China and 
India have been on the same side with their struggle at IMF. Economists say that Asia needs 
$8 trillion infrastructure development. The U.S. led IMF has not been too generous with 
Asian countries.  
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The IMF reform bill in 2010 would have given both China and India bigger voting 
shares due to their growing economies. It had a rather modest measure that would shift about 
6% of the voting right to developing countries, mostly from EU. In 2012, during the EU 
financial crisis, China put in an additional $43 billion and India $10 billion, with the 
understanding that the IMF reform bill would be approved. However, the US Congress 
blocked for the next 5 years. This created incentives to reconsider the suitability of the IMF 
and its role as the principal lender in the global economic system.
54
 
China initially announced that, like the NDB, the AIIB would have authorized capital 
of $100 billion, of which it would contribute $50 billion. It remains to be seen how much of 
the remaining $50 billion will be committed by the 39 other countries that expressed interest 
in joining. It will depend on the fiscal situation of potential shareholders as well as the course 
of negotiations on bank governance and policies, but clearly the AIIB will start off with a 
greater capital base than the NDB. Some estimates say, although the full $100 billion could 
be feasible in view of the interest expressed by potential members.
55
 Assuming a seven-year 




Facing the slowdown of its economic growth, China recently became much more 
active in identifying new sources of development, including new markets for its goods as 
well as new places for investing its capital, largely in neighboring regions. The rapid rise of 
the “One Belt, One Road” project, accompanied by the creation of the AIIB—a direct 
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competitor to the NDB of the BRICS demonstrates that China is ready to make any decisions 
necessary and quickly deploy its own capital in the effort to reach its economic targets. 
Figure 3.2: Scenarios of AIIB Loan Portfolio, 2016–2025 
 
 
Source: Calculations by Judith Tyson, ODI 
The possibility of future Asian economic integration occurring around the OBOR plan 
has a much stronger basis than potential BRICS-led integration. There should be no doubt 
that the main underlying idea of the OBOR plan is to benefit China: to support the country’s 
economic growth by supplying investment goods and speed up the development of the 
problematic Xinjiang-Uygur province. 
Due to geography, only one BRICS country—India—may directly benefit from this 
plan. Russia will not be an obvious beneficiary, as its eastern regions are rich in natural 
resources but lack the necessary connecting infrastructure, such as roads, and are located 
significantly to the north of any potential New Silk Road path. 




Turkey. As a point of comparison, the combined GDP of these three countries is equal to that 
of Russia, while their population is 2-3 times bigger. Therefore, it should not be a surprise if 
the world’s new economic tigers soon emerge from this part of the world—or if one day they 




3.3  ASIA and ASEAN 
On Nov 2015, the IMF released their World Economic Outlook, which provides a 
middle-of-the-road starting place for looking at the global economy. The IMF expects the 
world overall to expand in 2016 by 3.6 percent inflation adjusted, up from this year’s 




East Asia is the wild card for the global economic outlook. China in particular is 
opaque. The official growth rate of GDP is 6.9 percent, down from 7.0 in previous quarters, 
but there is uncertainty over the accuracy of the official statistics.
59
 
Since the Asian financial crisis, Asian policymakers have encouraged greater financial 
cooperation and integration within the region. Important steps taken include regional liquidity 
support arrangements through the Chiang Mai Initiative, the Asian Bond Fund, the Asian 
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Bond Market Initiative, and financial forums such as the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations plus Three and the Executives’ Meeting of East Asia–Pacific central Banks. The 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has also outlined plans to foster capital 
market integration, including by building capital market infrastructure and harmonizing 
regulations. 
While not an end in itself, regional financial integration is being pursued because it is 
expected to bring important benefits to Asia. Financial integration promises higher 
productivity and living standards, not least by improving the allocation of savings and 
investment. A diverse region with huge needs for infrastructure financing in the next decades 
Asia’s medium-term demand for infrastructure investment is large. Even in the more 
developed economies, there is still substantial demand for upgrading and maintenance.
60
 
Middle-income ASEAN countries such as Malaysia and Thailand are still investing 
heavily in the rail and public transport system. China, South Asia and lower-income ASEAN 
economies continue to have considerable gaps in the supply and quality of rail and road 
density as well as electricity provision, often complicated by large land mass and population 
size. As of 2012, the infrastructure stock in ASEAN-5 (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand) hovered 30% below the advanced economies’ benchmark, which 
was calculated at 70% of GDP by the McKinsey Global Institute.
61
  
The Philippines are particularly weak with regard to transport and trade-related 
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In China, infrastructure needs vary considerably across regions, and range from high-
profile projects (such as high-speed railways) to installing basic municipal infrastructure and 
environmental protection. China’s highway length more than doubled between 2004 and 
2014 and the share of high-speed railways was boosted from 33% to 50% of total railway 
kilometers, yet transport density still falls far short of that in advanced economies. 
The ADB estimated that around USD 8.2 trillion was needed in Asia for national 
infrastructure investment projects between 2010 and 2020, equivalent to nearly 5% of the 
region’s GDP. Another USD 300 billion was needed for regional projects. Building and 
upgrading of roads and energy/electricity infrastructure were deemed to have the largest 
financing requirements. HSBC quantified the need of infrastructure to support urbanization in 
emerging Asia at USD 11. trillion for the period 2010-2030.5 And USD 7 trillion was 
estimated by McKinsey to be needed for infrastructure and real estate investment in ASEAN-
5 alone between 2014 and 2030.
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In any case, Asia’s infrastructure needs likely make up a substantial portion of the USD 
57 trillion funding required to finance infrastructure projects globally up to 2030 according to 
the B20 Task Force on Infrastructure. The Task Force also assessed that there was a gap of 
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Figure 3.3: FDI to ASEAN- 5 Surpassing to China 
 
 
Source: McKinsey Global Institute 
If it can overcome operational and political challenges, the China-led AIIB may reduce 
infrastructure bottlenecks and boost developing Asia’s potential output by more than 1% 
point. The AIIB is poised to emerge as Asia's biggest investment-focused multinational 
development bank. Though it's the world's fastest growing region, developing Asia remains 
impeded by rusting and inadequate transport, power and communications networks. AIIB 
resources will be targeted at remedying that situation. The bank will probably launch by the 
end of the year and has attracted interest from 57 nations worldwide. 
Asia may need about $750 billion per year from now until 2020 to finance projects in 
transportation, energy supply, water facilities and other areas, according to the ADB. A 
business taskforce reporting to the G20 forecasts that a third to a fourth of infrastructure 




would be well positioned to reduce that shortfall. The bank's initial subscribed capital will be 
at least $50 billion and is expected to rise to $100 billion.
64
  
What sets the AIIB apart is its focus on infrastructure. The ADB committed about 60 
percent of its $21 billion in new loans in 2013 to infrastructure projects, or about $12.6 
billion. Given the AIIB's sole focus on infrastructure, its capacity to make loans toward 
building Asia's bridges and power plants might be 60 percent to 70 percent greater than its 
Manila-based rival's. 
The result may be a boost to infrastructure investment in non-China developing Asia of 
up to 0.5 percent of GDP a year. Long term, that may boost potential GDP in these countries 
by 1 to 1.5 percentage points. According to the IMF, a 1 percentage point increase in 
infrastructure investment as a proportion of GDP can raise annual output by 2-to-3% point 
long term. 
The OBOR initiative provides the framework for China’s outbound trade and 
investment strategy over the medium term, and charts the course for foreign policy. The plan 
which was started in 2013 spans 40 countries from Central and Southern Asia to the Middle 
East and Europe. Apart from support to domestic industries, infrastructure financing along 
the Belt and the Road is a key priority. Below are some of the relevant China led investment 
deals into South and Southeast Asia under the OBOR plan:
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Figure 3.4: Asia’s Infrastructure Lags as % of U.S. Level 
 
 
Source: World Bank and BloombergBriefs.com 
In Indonesia, China pledged up to $100 billion investment, half of which is planned to 
be invested in the power, railway and smelting sectors. The Jokowi government also plans to 
invest $429 billion in upgrading port infrastructure and construct 24 new ports over the next 5 
years to facilitate China's maritime investment initiative. 
In Sri Lanka, China participates in more than 10 overseas harbor projects as part of the 
OBOR Initiative. Colombo Port project was resumed in July 2015 after being halted for 
political reasons. 
In Vietnam, we have seen the China Southern Power Grid construction of a coal-fired 
power generation plant. The project is China’s first BOT power project in Vietnam and part 
of the 5-year Sino- Vietnam trading cooperation plan. Cambodia, Laos, Bangladesh, 
Myanmar. 




importance of infrastructure funding for MDBs’ financing in Asia. For the ADB, loan and 
guarantee exposure is concentrated mostly on China (27%), India (23%) and Indonesia (14%) 
as of the end of 2014. ADB’s largest non-sovereign exposures are in China, India and 




Developing Asia (up 9%) saw FDI inflows grow to historically high levels. They 
reached nearly half a trillion dollars in 2014, further consolidating the region’s position as the 
largest recipient in the world. FDI inflows to East and South-East Asia increased by 10% to 
$381 billion. In recent years, MNEs have become a major force in enhancing regional 
connectivity in the sub region, through cross-border investment in infrastructure.  
The security situation in West Asia has led to a six-year continuous decline of FDI 
flows (down 4% to $43 billion in 2014); weakening private investment in parts of the region 
is compensated by increased public investment. In South Asia (up 16% to $41 billion), FDI 
has increased in manufacturing, including in the automotive industry.
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China now surpasses the United States as the largest FDI recipient in the world. FDI 
inflows to China reached $129 billion in 2014, an increase of about 4%. This was driven 
mainly by an increase in FDI to the services sector, particularly in retail, transport and 
finance, while FDI fell in manufacturing, especially in industries that are sensitive to rising 
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By contrast, FDI flows from Japan and the United States declined by 39% and 21%, 
respectively. FDI outflows from China reached $116 billion. They continued to grow faster 
than inflows. FDI outflows from China grew by 15% to a record-high $116 billion; 
increasing faster than inflows into the country. Overseas acquisitions have become an 




Inflows to South Asia raised to $41 billion in 2014, primarily owing to growth in India, 
the dominant FDI recipient in the region. Both announced green field investments and cross-
border mergers and acquisitions increased across the region: the value of the former jumped 
by 48% to $39 billion, while that of the latter rose by about one quarter to $6 billion. At the 
regional level, FDI in manufacturing has risen, as illustrated by the automotive industry. A 
number of South Asian countries saw rising FDI from China. FDI inflows to Pakistan 
increased by 31% to $1.7 billion as a result of rising Chinese FDI flows in services, in 
particular a large investment made by China Mobile in telecommunications. In addition, 
Pakistan will benefit significantly from the China-Pakistan Industrial Corridor  and the 
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3.4  EU and Middle East 
European Union 
The reasons of Asian and emerging countries for joining the AIIB are quite 
straightforward. The AIIB project gathered 21 countries including China by the time the first 
“memorandum” was signed on 24 October 2014. Yet the “unexpected declaration” by 
Britain’s Chancellor George Osborne on 12 March 2015 that the UK wished to join the bank 
as a founding member provoked an “avalanche like wave of additions”, including Germany, 
France, Italy, and later on, Luxembourg, Denmark, and Switzerland.  “In one night”, the 




The European countries’ decision to join the bank is rational. Europe has experienced 
economic difficulties over the past few years, and it is looking to benefit from Asia’s 
impressive growth. Moreover, in spite of its own depressed economic environment, European 
Union member states have plenty of funds available for investment, and they are looking for 
more profitable opportunities than those available in Europe.  
Finally, France and Germany could easily leverage their companies’ significant 
experience, technologies, and operational knowledge in the context of infrastructure building 
in Asia, and thus reap the benefits of the planned infrastructure projects. Therefore, investing 
in the AIIB is “profitable” and “in line with the countries’ national interests”. Since China’s 
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influence in the world is growing fast, EU countries see the AIIB as an opportunity to deepen 
their relations with China.
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In 2011, China launched a new forum for cooperation with Central and East European 
countries: the ‘‘16+1.’’ This includes 11 EU countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia) and five EU 
candidate countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYROM [Macedonia], Montenegro, 
and Serbia). Although vastly different culturally, linguistically, and in terms of religion, these 
countries are united in their quest for Chinese investment.
73
 
They are also all former communist states and thus share some common historical 
experience with China. China is careful to explain that the ‘‘16+1’’ does not supplant, but 
rather supplements, EU–China relations. However, the 11 countries that are members of the 
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EU can influence policymaking in Brussels. At the ‘‘16+1’’ meeting in Warsaw in 2012, 
former Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao recommended 12 proposals in order to promote China–
Central Eastern European (CEE) economic cooperation and friendship.
74
 
The next China–CEE meeting was attended by new Premier Li and held in Bucharest 
in November 2013. The new Chinese leadership upgraded the ‘‘16+1’’ by formally 
institutionalizing it. The Chinese Foreign Ministry set up a China–CEE Cooperation 
Secretariat in Beijing. In response, some CEE countries organized counterpart departments, 




As U.S. Secretary of Defense in 2003, Donald Rumsfeld remarked on the ‘‘old and 
new Europe.’’ He maintained that ‘‘New Europe,’’ in 2003, was largely made up of the new 
member states of the EU from Eastern Europe that were formerly in the Soviet sphere of 
influence and traditionally supported the United States. Further, this is ‘‘New Europe’’ 
backed U.S. actions during the Iraq campaign.
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By contrast, Rumsfeld viewed the behavior of ‘‘Old Europe’’—turning to China to 
counterbalance the United States because of its actions in Iraq—in a less favorable light. 
China’s investments and increasing influence in the CEE may, in the longer term, help to 
undermine the ties to a region long seen as supportive of U.S. policies.
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On 16 December 2014, at the third meeting of Heads of Government of China and 
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Central and Eastern European Countries, it was agreed that the nations would construct a new 
Asia–Europe maritime land combined transport passage, which would include building a new 
Belgrade–Budapest Railway and Greece’s Piraeus Port. China’s massive investment in the 
infrastructure of Piraeus testifies once more to the critical position of Europe in the building 
of the ‘‘Belt and Road.’’ 
However, the 16 Central and Eastern European countries have differing attitudes 
toward China. Some are skeptical, but most need bridges, railways, roads, and they are 
balancing different policy goals. The CEE nations are a particular target for lobbying by 
China and are more likely to support China’s position internationally and regionally. The 
‘‘16+1’’ group is an important peg in support of the Western end of the ‘‘Belt and Road.’’ 
China’s activities in the region are greeted with ambivalence
78
 by some officials in Brussels 
who see the investments as an attempt to gain political influence in the region and within the 
EU. 
There was no coordination at the EU level about individual member states joining the 
AIIB. The United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy decided to join in March 2015. Some 
member states suggested that the EU itself should become a party to the AIIB.
79
 Some 
believed that the EU should coordinate a common position for the negotiations surrounding 
the founding of the Bank, in an effort to promote EU standards in the workings of the new 
institution. Further, more EU member states may join the AIIB in the future. 
As People Liberation Army’s (PLA) Deputy Chief of the General Staff Sun Jianguo 








stated recently, ‘‘ ‘No confrontation, no conflict’ does not mean ‘no struggle’ without the 
struggle the United States would still have no respect for China’s core interests.
80
’’ The Belt 
and Road initiative is a case in point. It is oriented toward China’s neighbors to the West and 
South, and it tacitly excludes the United States, even though the United States is also part of 
China’s greater neighborhood across the Pacific.
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The Belt and Road gained rapid traction and the business opportunities offered by 
China’s strategic design did not fail to attract some close U.S. allies in Europe, when in 
March 2015, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy decided to join the AIIB 
despite U.S. protests. After the UK decision, a senior U.S. official accused Britain of 
‘‘constant accommodation’’ of China.82 
Middle East 
Chinese President Xi Jinping's Middle Eastern tour—the first by a mainland leader in 
seven years—reveals the world's second-largest economy may depart from its trade-oriented 
foreign policy as it seeks to become a superpower.   
China-Arab ties date back to the early 1960s, during which the mainland has 
traditionally focused on energy, commerce and trade ties with the region, choosing to abstain 
from geopolitical tensions. But while Chinese energy imports and infrastructure projects 
around the OBOR trade initiative will likely form the bulk of Xi's meetings on this trip, 
politics may be unusually high on the agenda as well.  
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“Xi's visit constitutes a recognition that China needs to become a player in the Middle 
East as part of the protection of its interests and if it wants to be taken seriously as a major 
power,” said James Dorsey, senior fellow at Singapore's Nanyang Technological University. 
“Arab officials and pundits have long demanded that China act as a superpower and adopt a 
more active role in the region.”
83
 Last year, Yemen's civil war forced Xi to cancel plans to 
visit the region but since then, China has signaled a grudging recognition that it can longer 
ignore political issues, he added.  
In one sign of increased engagement, China's Foreign Ministry announced last month 
that it invited members of the Syrian government and the opposition to Beijing, in an 
apparent effort to position China as a mediator in the Syrian conflict.
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Xi's visit also comes on the heels of publication of China's "Arab Policy Paper," the 
first articulation of a policy towards the Middle East, and one that emphasized growing 
China-Arab ties in a number field, including political cooperation, economics, energy and 
security. Beijing's newfound engagement comes as Washington, long the sole power capable 
of managing regional disputes, takes a step back to concentrate on Asia instead.  
International ambitions and rivalries with Washington aside, there are more pressing 
reasons for Beijing to ramp up involvement in the region. Fears over terrorist attacks are 
likely a key factor behind Xi's visit, as the fundamentalist organization known as the Islamic 
State, increasingly targets the mainland amid rising ethnic strife in China's autonomous 
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 China depends on the Middle East for its oil supplies but has long taken 
a back seat in the region's disputes, only recently beginning to expand its role, especially in 
the Syrian crisis. 
“China is the biggest importer of Middle Eastern oil,” Zhu Feng, professor at Peking 
University's School of International Studies, told AFP. “So stability in the Middle East is 
what China would most like to see. “As China's economy has grown, its dependence on 
imported oil and natural gas has increased, making the Middle East a crucial part of 
Beijing's strategy as it seeks to expand its influence.”
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Last year, China helped broker a landmark nuclear deal with Iran, which has begun to 
emerge following years of international isolation. Days after the signing of the historic 
framework agreement, Iran was approved as a founding member of the Beijing-backed 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which is expected to provide funding for One Belt 
One Road. On Jan 15, China published its first official Arab Policy Paper, claiming a 
“broad consensus on safeguarding state sovereignty and territorial integrity, defending 
national dignity, seeking political resolution to hotspot issues, and promoting peace and 
stability in the Middle East.”
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Iran and China vow tighter ties that the Asian giant and the Middle East's foremost 
Shiite power aim to build economic ties worth up to $600 billion within the next 10 years. 
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The two leaders oversaw the signing of 17 agreements in areas including politics, the 
economy, security and cooperation on peaceful nuclear energy. The two countries agreed to 
enhance cooperation including in fossil and renewable energy, transportation, railways, 
ports, industry, commerce and services.  
In the statement Iran welcomed China's commercial “belt” and the “21st century Silk 
Seaway” projects, pledging to help the initiative. China has committed to invest and finance 
upstream and downstream energy projects in Iran, “acknowledges Iran's constructive role in 
the fight against terrorism and maintaining peace and stability in the region”, it added, 




This chapter shows that the top of Beijing’s regional diplomatic agenda is the OBOR 
initiative, a series of land- and sea-based trade routes intended to closely link China with 
regions to its west and south: Central Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, East 
Africa, and Europe. In addition, the AIIB including OBOR-related projects held its signing 
ceremony in June with the participation of 57 nations. Together, these two investment 
initiatives reflect Beijing’s proactive attempt to reshape the Asia and World economic to 
promoting the political order.  
The strategic use of economic incentives to pursue OBOR assists China in fulfilling its 
foreign policy objectives of improving diplomatic relations with its Asian neighbors and 
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expanding its regional and global influence. The OBOR initiative highlights China’s ability to 
use its enormous financial resources for infrastructure investment in Asian neighbors as an 
inducement for them to work with Beijing. If successful, the initiative will deepen 
infrastructure connectivity and economic integration by boosting cross border trade, 
investment and financial flows.  
Moreover, it provided economic benefits for both China and other countries that use or 
form part of the new transport systems. Thus, the initiative will likely strengthen China’s 
importance as an economic partner for its neighbors and enhance Beijing’s diplomatic 
leverage in the region. Greater investment in energy and mineral resources, particularly in 













Ⅳ. Regional Integration, Regional Order, Global Governance 
: How will AIIB influence China and the World? 
 
In this chapter, I explain how to China plans to construct both overland and maritime 
“OBOR and Silk Roads”.
89
 
I focus on infrastructure investments, such as China’s high-speed rail program. This 
demonstrates a change in global development system. China is now a lead player in 
development in various regions around the world. In addition, I highlight the bigger 
implications for geopolitics. China is now central to the multilateral lending system, and it is 
an important hub international finance and development. 
4.1 International Financial Architecture 
In the post-Washington Consensus shift
90
 in 1997, heavily emphasis was placed on the 
importance of appropriate institutions for growth. Literature has been unable to establish 
strong links between institutional design(s) and long-term economic performance. The 
institutional reforms demanded by the World Bank are rarely new, such as advising poor 
countries to improve the investment climate, invest in infrastructure and agriculture and 
educate girls. Institutions can become disabling for poor countries, because they are context-
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specific and rigid overtime.
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Current voting power in the World Bank has also been called into question. 
“Inadequate voting reforms mean the World Bank will continue to be overwhelmingly 
dominated by rich countries for decades” despite the fact that “developing countries represent 
over 80% of the world’s population and Bank’s membership”. In the next 5 years, 60% of 
voting power across the World Bank Group will go to high-income countries. Global powers 
such as India, China and Brazil are part of the middle-income countries with only one third of 
the votes while low-income countries languish on just 6%.
92
  
The latest reform in voting share reflects rising of emerging economies particularly 
China, but voting shares will continued to stagnate. Calculations of voting shares put heavy 
emphasis on economic weight (75%), followed by countries contributions to the International 
Development Association (IDA), which favors rich countries. At the current rate of change, it 
will take decades for developing countries to have a voice in World Bank policies. This 
reduces the World Bank’s legitimacy and effectiveness as an institution mandated to combat 
poverty. In the recent instability of the global financial system, developing countries are 
being pushed into a new debt crisis.  
The power of the World Bank was not seriously challenged until recently. With the rise 
of the emerging economies, the voting share in the World Bank has seriously 
underrepresented countries such as China. Its failure to integrate new international economic 
                                           
91 Uwmun in House institutionm, p. 9. 




powers into the current financial system has spurred the creation of new banking institutions. 
With the emergence of the NDB and AIIB, it signals “disgruntlement among developing 
nations with the largely US-dominated policies” in current international financial institutions. 
Although the World Bank have endorsed have endorsed the AIIB, active opposition from the 
United States remains. The interactions between these banks will have a huge impact on the 
future global economic order.
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How will AIIB influence China and the World? 
First, The AIIB will end the dominance of the colonial era Bretton woods institutions. 
The emerging and poor economies will now flock to AIIB instead of World Bank and IMF 
due to the stricter conditions imposed by the two of the said global financial institutions. 
China will also aim to curb the US’s and Japan's influence in Asia by diverting the 
nations from ADB and World Bank to AIIB. 
Second, American and European domination of world finance institutions will degrade. 
From the Marshall Plan after World War II and IMF and World Bank, America has played a 
central role in world financial Institutions. They have used this as leverage in their foreign 
policy by influencing various decisions. These institutions lend to developing nations but 
with strings attached i.e., democracy, more liberalized market access to foreign firms, human 
rights, women empowerment, etc.  
                                           




China has been seeking for years to gain a bigger role in existing institutions such as 
the IMF, the World Bank and the ADB. China has only a 4.2% stake in the World Bank 
while the U.S. has a 15.8% stake and Japan has a 6.8% stake. The U.S. and Japan have 15.6% 
and 15.7% stakes, respectively, in the ADB, while China’s is just 6.5%. “It is kind of strange 
that China is so underrepresented at the IMF and World Bank”... “it is not surprising that 
China is doing this.” As former ADB president said.
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Another of Xi’s aims is to undermine President Barack Obama’s “pivot to Asia” and 




Apart from pushing ahead with its own trade pact, the Free Trade Area of the Asia 
Pacific, Beijing is tapping its $3.89 trillion in foreign exchange reserves to set up 
multinational bodies like the AIIB, the NDB and a bank for the Central Asian-oriented 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Bank, while still seeking to increase its influence 
at the ADB and the World Bank. In July 2015, the BRICS group, which also includes Brazil, 
Russia, India and South Africa, agreed to set up a bank to be based in Shanghai by 2016. 
Questioning the need for yet another multilateral lender, Japan and the U.S. raised 
concerns over whether the AIIB would have a transparent governance structure and adequate 
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standards for project selection, preparations, procurement, and environmental impact and 
resettlement. After years of working to reform and improve standards at the World Bank, the 
worry is that AIIB might undercut them for the sake of commercial or political expedience.
96
 
The U.S. Treasury’s concerns about the AIIB focused largely on two issues: standards 
and governance structures. On the question of governance, some feared that China’s political 
system would mean that it would be unlikely to avoid using the bank to serve Chinese 
interests at the expense of recipient countries. There was concern that China’s intent was to 
retain as much leverage as possible in the institution. That China would retain a veto power 
and that the first president of the bank would be Chinese was, to some extent, expected. 
 While the architects of the AIIB viewed this as a step toward greater accountability 
and efficiency, others saw it as an effort to escape meaningful oversight. This highlights the 
disagreement between the US and China, but a fundamental tension within existing 
development banks. While, in this case, the US prioritized strong checks and balances, the 
architects of the AIIB wanted to ensure that the management of the bank was held 
responsible for the success of projects, and that those projects.
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4.2  Regional Integration, Regional Order, Global Governance 
What is China’s global economics’ strategy? China building  its own international 
bodies, shouldn’t be a surprise. In response to the increasing US presence in Central Asia—
especially after the American’s gained permission from Uzbekistan to base air force assets 
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there for the Afghanistan campaign — China created the SCO. Since its inception in 2007, it 
has expanded its membership and increased its activities, including regular heads of state 
meetings and joint military exercises. 
The formation of regional integration frameworks can best be understood as an attempt 
to create a preferred regional framework in which the lead state can exercise exclusive 
influence. In this context, it is important to observe not only which countries are included in a 
regional framework, but also which countries are excluded from it. For example, the distinct 
feature of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is its exclusion of the China, and that of the 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is its exclusion of the US. 
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Bank is a multilateral organization that 
achieves three important strategic objectives for China: bringing Russia into a regional 
security forum that China leads; increasing China’s influence in Central Asia; and providing 
something of a bulwark against further US encroachment in Central Asia.
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Beyond its frosty relations with China, Manila is already home to the Japanese-run 
Asian Development Bank. But the Philippines have decided to jump onboard the AIIB train. 
It will find a seat alongside other unlikely members, such as Britain, Germany, Australia and 
South Korea. What makes these nations a peculiar choice for the AIIB is the fact that one of 
their key allies, the United States, is morally opposed to the bank — even though it now 
publicly endorses it.  
                                           





President Obama is opposed to AIIB because the World Bank is a U.S.-run institution 
that provides international loans to countries for capital programs. It has served to promote 
U.S. interests in Southeast Asia and around the world since World War II. The AIIB is a direct 
threat to the influence of the World Bank — and subsequently U.S. primacy — in Southeast 




Consider the example of the Philippines. That country needs money to enhance supply 
lines and increase trade flow. As a result, it may be more willing to forget about China’s 
intrusive man-made islands in exchange for a favor from the AIIB. With the bank still very 
much in its formative years, how projects will be selected or refused is still murky. 
Regardless, it is a Chinese project from its inception and will undoubtedly be a tool for 
Beijing to entrench itself as the regional leader economically and politically. 
In essence, countries are accommodating China’s ambitions in return for economic 
favors. The U.S. hoped that a fear of China’s ambitions might outweigh the potential 
economic gains for the nations of Southeast Asia. However, evidence suggests that the allure 
of cheap investments and trade increase outweigh fears of Chinese empowerment.  
The Scholar Geoff Dyer says that, after decades of dominance in world geopolitics, the 
U.S. is now facing a growing rivalry with China that will be the major factor in world politics 
in the coming decades. But that rivalry is not likely to be as intense and bitter as the Cold War 
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rivalry with the Soviet Union. Instead, it will be characterized by a constant balancing of 
power and shifting coalitions, according to Dyer, economics correspondent for the Financial 
Times. Dyer focuses on three phenomena: the rising Chinese challenge to U.S. power in 
military might in Asia, nationalist policies on the world stage, and the challenge to the U.S. 
dollar by the strengthening Chinese currency.
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That China is challenging the US on a primarily economic basis, but to a less extent, 
diplomatically. Militarily, China is focusing on regional dominance over the South China Sea, 
which the US is checking. Despite its occasional tough talks, China is not really seeking 
prolonged military confrontations, which is extremely costly and increases the risk of 
domestic instability. The main priority is still economic development and trade, then 
gradually leveraging that into soft power such as AIIB. 
During the last year meeting between Xi Jinping and Obama in Washington, It remains 
to be seen whether a new administration will be capable and willing to expend some of its 
political capital in Washington in order to join the AIIB and make sure that its policies are 
aligned with the interests of American foreign policy, which the United States so well knows, 
can only happen from the inside. Decisions are made by those that show up; being in the 
room where they are actually made is a necessity, something that the United States has 
traditionally been aware of and used to its own advantage.  
This time around however, it seemingly forgot this important lesson. Instead, the AIIB 
became a symbol of China’s new found role in international politics. For its part, the United 
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States continuing decision not to participate as a founding member and its decision to cajole 
its allies in not signing up was written in this narrative as an example of the hegemonic power 
being petulant and unable to accommodate the changes in relative power taking place in 
global politics. Its decision to be particularly vocal in showing its displeasure with the UK’s 
decision, the news regarding its diplomatic efforts to strong-arm allies in not joining the 
organization further added to this perception. 
In turn, it only helped to solidify the narrative and framing process that China was 
intent on using in regards to its role in international society, that is, as a country that, given its 
power, has the motivation and finds the need to be an important factor in managing 
international society and maintaining systemic stability – a key role of a great power but is 
only willing to do so if its opinions are heard. This, in turn, can only happen when China has 
decision-making powers on the processes used inside the institutions that manage and serve 
as ultimate guarantors of international order.
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4.3  Silk Road Fund, Rise of a Hegemon 
What is the “New Silk Road”? The OBOR initiative might be better translated "A road 
for each belt" where "belt" refers to east-west strips like the tropical zone and the North 
Temperate Zone. Developing economic ties with Central Asia is in large part an aid program 
for isolated Western China which was left behind in the coastal-led modernization. Like Italy, 
China will be aiding its less-developed pole for decades.  
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Rail to Europe via Kazakhstan and Russia has long been under development but gone 
slowly compared to the huge volume of ship traffic between Asia and Europe. As with oil and 
gas pipelines, these require large investment but could be interrupted in any transit country, 
giving them leverage and increasing costs.  
Gas from Turkmenistan and oil from Kazakhstan has already been a moderate success 
for China, again primarily for the benefit of Western China which is far from overloaded 
eastern ports anyway. OBOR was announced with a push to sell high speed rail across 
Eurasia. This is unlikely to be competitive with air travel for long distances or lightly traveled 
routes. Europe and even Middle East are more readily accessed via Central Asia toward the 
Gulf and Africa. 
President Xi Jinping first presented China’s vision for a “Silk Road Economic Belt” 
during a 2013 speech in Kazakhstan. The idea was to “forge closer economic ties, deepen 
cooperation, and expand development in the Euro-Asia region”.  
While Beijing stresses that the Silk Road framework will be built on an “inclusive and 
balanced regional economic cooperation architecture that benefits all”,6 it is part of a broader 
push to ensure that China has a say that is commensurate to the size of its economy and 
military in setting the strategic and economic agenda of the region. The Silk Road initiatives 
and the recently launched AIIB are part of a broader push by Beijing to develop the 







China identifies transportation bottlenecks as a primary barrier to regional economic 
integration. In its initial stages, the Silk Road Economic Belt is being framed as a series of 
transportation, energy, and telecommunication infrastructure projects. The blueprint describes 
the development of a “Eurasian Land Bridge” as well as “China-Central Asia-West Asia and 
China-Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridors” that will be constructed by connecting a 
series of “core cities” from China to Europe and the BRICS NDB.  
China’s state-owned policy banks will play a critical role in financing OBOR-affiliated 
projects. In April 2015, reports indicated that Beijing intended to draw on its sizable foreign 
exchange reserves to inject at least $62 billion dollars in capital into two of its policy banks to 
support OBOR. These capital investments included $32 billion to the China Development 
Bank (CDB) and $30 billion to the Export-Import Bank of China.  
Additionally, China’s CITIC, a state-owned investment conglomerate, and its 
subsidiaries announced plans to provide over $700 billion Yuan (approximately $113 billion) 
in debt and equity to support roughly OBOR related projects. Bank of China has also made 
statements that it intends to significantly increase its support with a goal of extending $20 
billion in credit this year and $100 billion over the next three years.  
China’s planned $40 billion Silk Road Fund, officially established in December 2014, 
is viewed as the primary bilateral investment vehicle for projects under OBOR. At least $16 
                                           




billion will be dedicated to funding projects in Central Asia. The fund was initially 
capitalized with $10 billion in contributions from China’s foreign exchange reserves, the 
China Investment Corporation, the Export-Import Bank of China, and the China 
Development Bank. Chinese experts have said that this fund will more closely resemble a 




The fund is to be profit-driven with a focus on delivering “reasonable mid- and long-
term investment returns.” In mid-April, The People’s Bank of China announced the first 
investment from this fund would be $1.65 billion for the construction of a hydroelectric dam 
across the Jhelum River in northern Pakistan. 
Finally, China has pushed for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to 
establish a financial institution that would provide an additional funding stream for OBOR 
projects. Russia has historically been concerned over the potential of an SCO development 
bank increasing China’s leverage in Central Asia, but this dynamic appears to be shifting. In 
March 2015, SCO General Secretary Dmitry Mezentsev said that the organization would 
“combine its development strategies” with China’s Silk Road strategy and that all members 
would be invited to participate in the initiative.
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How would China's Silk Road proposal affect the world in terms of trade, economy, 
and politics when it is completed? There are three broad outcomes: 
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First, the China's interior will be opened up to more trade, bolstering development and 
economic growth of its western landlocked provinces. Second, the China secures an overland 
trade route free of any potential US blockade and bolsters its influence with its neighbors. 
Third, surrounding nations will benefit from more trade and Chinese investment, bolstering 
development of their economies and landlocked provinces without political interference from 
the outside. 
The Silk Road proposal is, a marketing term for a regional trade agreement put forward 
by the china in reaction to the US led Trans-Pacific Partnership. 
The china’s interior will be opened up to more trade, bolstering development and 
economic growth of its western landlocked provinces. The China secures an overland trade 
route its influence with its neighbors. Surrounding nations will benefit from more trade and 
Chinese investment, bolstering development of their economies and landlocked provinces.  
The Silk Road projects will connect countries that represent 55 percent of world GNP, 
70% of global population, and 75 percent of known energy reserves. China is to launch five 
years of strategic planning next year, with implementation expected to begin in 2021. 
China’s era of high growth is gone. However, the Silk Road projects could provide 
China with a new opportunity for development. Through the usual discussion of mutually 
beneficial cooperation with neighboring countries and of sharing China’s reform and opening 
experience to help partner countries promote economic development and address economic 




technology and production capacity is in less developed markets.
105
 The Silk Road plans 
could help Chinese companies improve their “capacity for transnational operations”, as well 
as to establish “foreign trade strongholds” and “production bases”.
 106
 







Source: Wall Street Journal 
More prosaically, the People Liberation Army’s (PLA) Major General Ji Mingkui, a 
professor at China’s National Defense University, wrote that the ‘‘New Silk Road’’ provides 
a useful economic carrot to deal with the majority of security problems China has with its 
neighbors. This economic card is also an important one to play in the framework of China’s 
quiet strategic competition for influence with the United States and Japan.
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I think that the AIIB is a part of the wider “New Silk Road" initiative by China to 
deepen trade and investment both in the rest of Asia and the wider world. It could actually be 
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a positive thing for the region's stability. 
I believe through the building of interdependent relationships based on shared 
economic interests, this New Silk Road plan should deepen political linkages, improve 
mutual understanding and foster long-term stability in the region.  
The china’s interior will be opened up to more trade, bolstering development and 
economic growth of its western landlocked provinces. The China secures an overland trade 
route free of any potential US blockade and bolsters its influence with its neighbors. 
Surrounding nations will benefit from more trade and Chinese investment, bolstering 
development of their economies and landlocked provinces without political interference from 
the outside. 
The Silk Road proposal is a marketing term for a regional trade agreement put forward 
by the china in reaction to the US led Trans Pacific Partnership. The Silk Road Fund, new 
ventures are the BRICS bank, the AIIB and the Silk Road Fund. In short, they are a response 
not only to the IMF’s failure to provide the world’s most important emerging economies with 
representation that’s commensurate with their economic clout, but also to the perceived 
shortcomings of the IMF and ADB. In other words, they are far more than a new foreign 
policy tool for Beijing to deploy on the way to cementing its status as regional hegemony. 
4-4.  Rise of Yuan, Global Currency 
In 1960, Yale Professor Robert Triffin predicted that the exchange rate system adopted 




soon end, and this became known as the Triffin Dilemma. It was a dilemma because either of 
the two alternative courses ahead—continued large U.S. trade deficits financed by others in 
dollars or a substantial devaluation of the dollar to reduce the deficit—would produce the 
same fatal result for the dollar peg / gold convertibility system. And this is what happened in 
August 1971, as described earlier.
108
  
The financial system today, with historic irony, faces a similar dilemma, which can be 
called the dollar twilight dilemma. The same two alternative courses lie ahead: continued 
large U.S. trade deficits financed by others in dollars or a substantial devaluation of the dollar 
to reduce the deficit. The dilemma impact on the financial system this time, however, will be 
more far-reaching and involve transition from the dollarized system of the past seven decades 
into some form of multi–key currency relationship. And this, in turn, will have greater 
consequences for international trade and investment than occurred in the 1970s.
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The shift is from the dollar to other currencies in finance trade. This is the most clear 
and best-documented dimension of the decline of the dollarized financial system. Trade in the 
European region is shifting to financing in Euros and other European currencies, while the 
share of Chinese trade financed in Yuan has soared from almost nothing in 2009 to about 25% 
in 2014. The Yuan has risen to become the fifth largest currency for international payments 
from number 23 in 2013. In December 2014, 45% of international payments were in dollars, 
28% in Euros, 8% in sterling, 3% in yen, and 2% in Yuan. Thus less than half of payments 
are now financed in dollars and this share will continue to decline.  
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China has actively promoted this shift to Yuan financing through the recent 
establishment of a network of clearing banks that makes the Yuan convertible for financing 
trade. Such Yuan financing had been carried out principally through Hong Kong, but in 
March 2014 the Bank of England and the People’s Bank of China signed such a clearing 
account, and eight other accounts were established in Frankfurt, Luxembourg, Sydney, and 
elsewhere during the course of the year. One provision related to the China–South Korea 
FTA, now in the final stages of negotiation, is that bilateral trade will be financed in the two 
currencies of the participants and no longer in dollars.
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Figure 4.2: Growing Importance in Trade Settlements, Global Payments 
  
 
Source: Bloomberg, Swift 
The outlook for the Yuan as a reserve currency is more important for the course ahead, 
and while also fraught with uncertainty, is likely over time to experience a rise to become one 
of three principal reserve currencies, together with the dollar and the euro. Chinese policy is 
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to have the Yuan become a major international currency, including as a reserve currency, and 
the central barrier to this is the lack of Yuan convertibility, which is maintained to prevent a 
rapid rise of the exchange rate and a consequent decline in export competitiveness. But small, 
cautious steps for convertible Yuan financial assets have been taken over the past several 
years and market pressures are building for such convertibility to accelerate.  
The “dim sum bond” market for Yuan-denominated debt issues outside of China has 
soared from $1 billion in 2010 to $12 billion in 2013. The rapid rise of Yuan trade financing 
facilities has already been noted. In November 2014, the Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock 
Connect was launched. It allows offshore investors to buy $49 billion in mainland stock 
shares, which is a first step toward opening the Chinese stock market to global investors. 
Together, these are still relatively small openings to currency convertibility, but they point to 
the direction being pursued by Chinese authorities.
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The new ventures are the BRICS bank, the AIIB, and the Silk Road Fund. We’ve 
discussed each of these at length and we’ve also shown that in one way or another, they all 
represent a shift away from the multilateral institutions that have dominated the post-war 
economic order. The perceived short comings of the IMF and ADB. In other words, they are 
far more than a new foreign policy tool for Beijing to deploy on the way to cementing its 
status as regional hegemony.
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The role of these new institutions in helping the Yuan to replace the dollar as the 
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world’s reserve currency was made clear when, in April, we noted that although Beijing has 
sought to play down the degree to which the ventures will serve to help establish a new world 
economic order with China at the helm, the fact that Beijing “may encourage the $100b AIIB 
and $40b Silk Road Fund to issue loans directly in Yuan” (via Bloomberg) and the fact that 




At the IMF spring meetings in Washington D.C., the Yuan moved a step closer to 
reserve currency status. Managing director Christine Lagarde said China's financial reforms 
were "very positive steps" toward including the currency in the SDR basket. The Fund also 
edged toward removing its long-standing assessment of the Yuan as undervalued.
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China has played its cards effectively. In terms of international payments, the Yuan is 
not in the top ranks of global currencies. China's capital account remains controlled, which 
means it's a stretch to describe the currency as "freely usable" — a requirement for inclusion 
in the SDR basket. That means expectations and politics are playing a critical role in the SDR 
decision. Expectations are driven by China's continued rise, with potential to rival the U.S. as 
the world's largest economy in the next decade. The launch of the AIIB will help shift the 
substance and the politics.
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 AIIB loans might help push the Yuan as an international 
currency. If China does not get a bigger voice in the IMF, its leaders can focus on their own 
institutions. 




 Tom Orlik, “China's Yuan and AIIB Wins Symbolic, Not Yet Substantive”, Bloomberg Brief, Apr 2015. p. 2. 
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The U.S. overtook the U.K. as the world's main economic engine at the end of the 19th 
century. It wasn't until the creation of the Bretton Woods system after World War II that it 
emerged as the main power in the International Monetary Fund, with the dollar anchoring the 
global financial system. China's symbolic rise has been breathtaking. It may be a while before 
its substantial position catches up.
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I think, use of China’s currency in trade and foreign exchange transactions continues to 
rise. Limited foreign access to the mainland’s markets remains a barrier to more rapid 
progress. As the world’s largest exporter, China has a natural advantage when it comes to 
raising the importance of the Yuan in trade settlement. In 2014, 1.65 trillion Yuan of China’s 






imports and exports were settled in Yuan in the first quarter, unchanged from the same period 
a year earlier. That’s equal to about 30 percent of total trade. 
The AIIB helping the Yuan to replace the dollar as a world’s reserved currency. Beijing 
has sought to play down the degree to which the ventures will serve to help establish a new 
world economic order with China at the helm, the fact that Beijing “may encourage the $100b 
AIIB and $40b Silk Road Fund to issue loans directly in Yuan” (via Bloomberg) and the fact 
that the AIIB will establish a currency basket with China set to push for the Yuan to take a 
prominent role with the AIIB members. Therefore, the Yuan promoting an international 
reserved currency and potentially declined the dollar.  
The Chinese Yuan is grossly underrepresented in global trade. It could quadruple in use 
and it would only put a marginal dent in the use of the US dollar. This deal with Russia alone 
will have virtually no impact on the dominance of the US dollar. 
Nov 2014, the petro-dollar system is the heart and soul of America's domination over 
the global reserve currency, and their right to make all nations have to purchase U.S. dollars 
to be able to buy oil in the open market. Bound through an agreement with Saudi Arabia and 
OPEC in 1973, this de facto standard has lasted for over 41 years and has been the driving 
force behind America's economic, political, and military power.
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But on Nov 3, a new chink in the petro-dollar system was forged as China signed an 
agreement with Qatar to begin direct currency swaps between the two nations using the Yuan, 
                                           









China, Russia, or one of the BRICS nations are finalizing agreements that supersede 
the old system of dollar trade and reliance on the petro-dollar system. And as many countries 
begin to reject the dollar due to the exported inflation that is growing in nations that are 
relegated to having to hold them for global oil purchases, alternatives such as the Chinese 
Yuan will become a more viable option, especially now that the Asian power has taken over 
the top spot as the world's biggest economy. 
Fasten your seatbelts; 2015 will be a whirlwind pitting China, Russia and Iran against 
what I have described as the Empire of Chaos. So yes – it will be all about further moves 
towards the integration of Eurasia as the US is progressively squeezed out of Eurasia. We 
will see a complex geostrategic interplay progressively undermining the hegemony of the US 
dollar as a reserve currency and, most of all, the petrodollar.
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The Russians aren’t the only ones involved, either. Beijing already has swap 
arrangements with a long list of co-conspirators in Southeast Asia and in November sealed a 
swaps deal with Australia. On Christmas day of 2011, it signed a swap agreement with 
regional rival Japan. And in June, it signed an MOU to get advice on currency derivatives 
from none other than the Chicago Mercantile Exchange.
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China gains power at IMF. Yuan Inclusion in SDRs likely. The US to lose IMF 
majority vote. The reforms are important for Asia as their purpose is to give China, along 
with other Asian and emerging market countries, a bigger say in the IMF's affairs. China has 
long advocated less reliance on a single reserve currency - the US dollar - and a move 
towards a reserve system based on a basket of currencies.  
China would like the Yuan to be included in this basket of currencies and an important 
step in this direction will take place this year when the IMF considers the composition of the 
SDR basket. The planned changes to the IMF, along with the creation of the AIIB, another 
Chinese initiative, form part of a bigger picture, which is an alternative international financial 





This chapter addressed three main arguments that form the foundation of dominant 
china’s foreign policy approaches in regional integration “Silk Road Belt”, “new financing 
development international system”, and the“rise of Yuan, global currency”. 
First, the Silk Road proposal is a marketing term for a regional trade agreement put 
forward by the china in reaction to the US led Trans Pacific Partnership. The Silk Road Fund, 
new ventures are the BRICS bank, the AIIB and the Silk Road Fund. In short, they are a 
response not only to the IMF’s failure to provide the world’s most important emerging 
economies with representation that’s commensurate with their economic clout, but also to the 





perceived shortcomings of the IMF and ADB. In other words, they are far more than a new 
foreign policy tool for Beijing to deploy on the way to cementing its status as regional order. 
Second, beyond the pursuit of geo-economic interests, China may also use AIIB as an 
instrument to realize its own geopolitical objectives, including expanding its sphere of 
political and security influence westward through the new belt and road initiative. Potential 
adversaries surround China, with Japan in the east (and the U.S. beyond it), the Philippines 
and Vietnam in the southeast and India in the south. Thus, China seeks closer ties with 
Central Asian countries through overland routes and with friendly Southeast Asian, South 
Asian and Middle Eastern countries through maritime routes. China may use AIIB in addition 




Third, the launch of the AIIB will help shift the substance and the politics.
123
 AIIB 
loans might help push the Yuan as an international currency. If China does not get a bigger 
voice in the IMF, its leaders can focus on their own institutions. The AIIB will establish a 
currency basket with China set to push for the Yuan to take a prominent role with the AIIB 
members. Therefore, the Yuan promoting an international reserved currency and potentially 
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5.1 US - China Power Transition 
AIIB aims to lend funds for infrastructure development in Asia, and this can 
considerably increase the clout of China, since many Asian economies are infrastructure 
hungry. China has been doing lot of bilateral infrastructure development in recent years; with 
AIIB, it will be multi-lateralized and formalized. Till recently, IMF and World Bank are the 
de-facto development agencies of the world. However, they are disproportionately controlled 
by the developed world, and this rouses many a developing countries for not giving them a 
fair share of say. 
The success of AIIB will depend on the impact that it can make to the infrastructure of 
the needy countries, and the cost that it extracts from them in return. It will also need to 
ensure that it learns from the strengths WB/IMF and co-operates rather than competing with 
these institutions. Naturally then, China can use its leverage in AIIB, to further its 
geopolitical goals vis-a-vis other countries including United States, It can also, increase its 
say in the global governance, while causing some concerns among China's neighbors. 
It has been suggested that China might use the AIIB to develop new Silk Road, an 
overland and maritime route connecting Asia and Europe. While such a road will be 
undoubtedly help the regional economy by the virtue of increasing connectivity between 




neighbors, some of which are strong US allies, given that there is an ongoing dispute about 
South and East China seas. A successful AIIB might also fast-track the long over-due reform 
of World Bank and IMF in order to prevent further fragmentation of developmental funds. 
In sum, AIIB definitely has the potential to give China a bigger chair at the world table, 
and help reinvigorate the Bretton Woods institutions (WB/IMF), but all the opportunities will 




The Obama administration has made strengthening U.S. leadership in Asia a top 
priority of its foreign policy. Through its Asia “rebalance” strategy. – also known as the 
“pivot to Asia” the Obama administration has sought to preserve and extend the U.S. position 
in the Asia-Pacific region, correcting the imbalance that resulted from two protracted wars in 
Central and Western Asia. One observer summarized this when stating, “One of the most 
important tasks of American statecraft over the next decade will therefore be to lock in a 




In the global distribution of economic power, over the course of the same decade the 
US will nonetheless remain the dominant regional and global military power, and by a 
massive margin. While China’s increasing defense spending will continue to close the gap, 
there is no serious prospect of it reaching military parity with the U.S. before mid-century, if 
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at all. China, like the rest of the world, will remain justifiably mindful of America’s 
overwhelming military power. This is a core assumption in Chinese strategic thinking. 
Accordingly, President Obama and other senior officials have repeatedly stated that the 
US does not aim to contain China’s rise. In fact, Obama did so in a joint press conference 
with Chinese President Xi Jinping during the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
summit in Beijing in November 2014, shortly after two major U.S. allies decided not to join 
AIIB. 
The president said, “I have repeatedly reiterated and displayed through the actions of 
our administration that we want China to succeed. And we actively encourage our friends and 
allies in the region to foster a strong and cooperative relationship with China.” U.S. officials 
have, for years, called upon China to act as a “responsible stakeholder,” that the international 
system sustains their peaceful prosperity, so they work to sustain that system.”
126
  
However, the US has not been as sensitive when it comes to multilateral political and 
economic institution building. Instead, Washington has, at times, seemed content to permit 
the emergence of “rival regionalisms.” Rather than welcome a greater Chinese role in 
regional institutions, challenging Beijing to act as a responsible stakeholder, the US has 
seemed, at best, resigned and, at worst, hostile to China’s efforts to create its own institutions 
outside the existing regional architecture. While China has its own reasons for wanting to 
build new regional institutions, Washington has failed to use multilateral organizations as a 
means to give China a greater stake in the existing order and to counter the argument that the 
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US seeks to contain or otherwise limit China’s power in Asia.
127
 
It is, to some extent, understandable that the US is defensive about the China challenge 
to existing institutions. The existing system of international financial institutions, built and 
sustained by the United States and its allies, is an important pillar of the global economy and 
a tool by which the disputes and promoting regional integration. 
The notion of “Chinese Dream”
128
 can also be understood as a new principle guiding 
China’s own development and how China relates to the rest of the world.  
At the APEC forum held in Beijing in November 2014, President Xi observed that 
leaders of the region “are duty-bound to create and fulfill an Asia-Pacific dream for our 
people”.
 129
 He further elaborated that the Asia Pacific dream is about staying ahead of 
global development and making greater contribution to the well-being of mankind. 
Meanwhile, the idea of China offering to share its “dream” of wealth and power has yet to 
win the endorsements by those Western powers already in dominant positions of decision-
making in global economic governance.  
The consequences of this emerging strategic and economic asymmetry in the U.S.-
China relationship will first manifest in the Asia-Pacific region. The shifting balance of 
economic power is also beginning to be seen globally, where China’s economic presence in 
Africa, Latin America and Europe also challenges the long-standing economic primacy of the 
US. China’s growing global economic and political role will also begin to reshape 
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international norms, rules and institutions. It will reverberate across geopolitics, global trade, 
investment, capital flows, reserve currency status, climate change, other environmental 
challenges and global people movements. And it will also influence the great questions of 
war and peace in the decades ahead.
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Entangling security challenges outside the Asia Pacific continue to add layers of 
difficulty to the Obama administration’s plans to re-weight its commitment in its foreign and 
security policy toward economic, military and diplomatic engagement with the region. The 
shifts of naval assets to the region, deeper defense cooperation with allies, U.S. participation 
in the East Asia Summit, and diplomacy to support democracy in Myanmar are all among 
many new moves that can be attributed to the rebalance.  
Some of the US’s signature programs, namely the TPP, continue to stumble toward 
implementation, while China’s recent regional initiatives, such as the AIIB, complicate the 
rebalance’s objective of shaping the region’s institutions and architecture. With the rebalance 
now framed as a set of sustained strategic goals to intensify and strengthen commercial 
interactions with the Asia-Pacific and to respond to security challenges in the region, the 
rebalance is going to be a work in progress for the long-term or until a new administration 
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5.2  Recommendations: Competition or Corporation 
The AIIB needs to be seen in a broader context: it is part of a larger Chinese effort to 
create a set of new economic and political institutions and an expanding network of physical 
infrastructure projects that will have Beijing at their center. China is attempting to build a 
new regional order in Asia that will be nested within, but also separate from, the existing 
global order. 
I think the US made a strategic mistake in its opposition of the AIIB but also more 
broadly by strategically choosing to take a combative stance against China instead of 
engaging on a constructive basis. 
Now there is a competing organization in which America will play no role and is likely 
to be successful given the recent inclusion of many leading economies as well as China's very 
lengthy track record of infrastructure development. This is going to have an impact on the 
ability for U.S. companies to compete on project bids when going up against companies from 
China and other member countries like the UK.   
My view is that the US made a mistake, not as much in opposing the AIIB but in 
dragging its feet on the inclusion of China into existing organizations like the World Bank 
and IMF. China has little voice in these organizations relative to its economic weight and has 
been pressing for decades to gain more say. The establishment of the AIIB at this juncture 
was not inevitable instead. 
It is the result of a strategic mistake. The US would be in a better position if it had 




second-highest position within the World Bank and IMF, then the United States would still 
have had a great deal of control and China would probably not have pushed so hard to 
establish the AIIB this early. 
I believe that the decision to drag its feet on engaging vs. blocking a rising China is due 
in large part to the current political atmosphere. Moving forward much will depend on how 
China and US engage with one another. If the two countries do not approach each other, AIIB 
and the New Development Bank will become a challenge to the current order; but if they do, 
particularly if the existing power (that is, the United States) accommodates China in the 
current order, the two new banks can become complements to the current multilateral order. 
The positive view sees China-led AIIB assisting Asia’s developing countries in 
financing infrastructure development that not only benefits them but also has positive 
spillovers to firms and people outside of these countries. It finds value in China’s willingness 
to assume leadership, and use its growing economic and financial power, in providing 
international public goods in the form of strengthened infrastructure development and 
connectivity in Asia, and in the opportunity the bank provides for China to become a 
responsible international player. 
Accounting for one-third of the world’s productivity, the relationship of the US and 
China will remain the focus of global politics for the foreseeable future. However, neither the 
US nor China—nor the two together— can enjoy the kind of hegemonic control that existed 
in earlier unipolar eras. The diffuse interdependence created by globalization gives every 




Despite apparent parity, the US and China do not face each other as hegemony and challenger, 
but rather as the largest players in a world that neither controls. As the primary nodes of a 
world order that they cannot dominate, the United States and China are likely to restrain their 
rivalry. If not, they will isolate themselves. 
A stable and peaceful China-U.S. relationship is in the interest of both two countries 
and the world. The critical question now is how to solve the problem of mutual strategic trust 
deficit between them. Since neither country has a solution to it so far, the best way is to 
effectively manage the differences while create more opportunities for “cooperation”.  
The New Silk Road Initiative (or the One Belt One Road Strategy) raised by the 
Chinese government two years ago offers an opportunity for the two countries to have 
practical cooperation in the economic and development sectors, especially in Central and 
South Asia, where the two countries share common interests, such as regional security and 
stability, sustainable economic development of the regional countries.
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China’s pivot westward could also alarm India and Russia. In attempting to break free 
from U.S. encirclement, Beijing may in fact stoke similar fears of encirclement in India, 
which considers the Indian Ocean its natural backyard. For Moscow, greater Chinese 
presence in Central Asia—both political and economic—could produce mixed blessings for 
Russia’s overall strategic position. On the one hand, Chinese engagement could ease strategic 
and economic pressure on Russia by sharing the burden of restricting U.S. influence and 
suppressing radical Islam in the region. On the other hand, it could reduce Russia’s soft 
                                           





power and influence within a region where it has traditionally exerted dominance.  
China’s expanding influence in Central and South Asia has significant implications for 
the US. Washington confronts a wide range of daunting security challenges abroad and tight 
fiscal constraints on defense spending at home. Whatever the future might hold, China will 
continue to be a major challenge for the United States. As part of the US “rebalance toward 
the Asia-Pacific,” proclaimed in 2012, Washington seeks a constructive partnership with the 
most potent emerging power in the region. But such a relationship cannot be assumed. 
Much of the attention to China’s growing power and influence has focused on 
Northeast and Southeast Asia. China’s star is also rising in Central and South Asia. 
Nevertheless, Beijing’s strategy is driven by deep-seated insecurities. China’s Communist 
Party rulers are preoccupied by perceived threats to domestic stability and national unity and 
acutely sensitive to the potential for ethnic and extremist instability on the periphery to spill 
over into China.  
Beijing thus places a premium on maintaining stability just beyond its borders. China 
seeks peaceful, predictable, and secular regimes as neighbors. Moreover, China desires to 
expand its influence in neighboring states and limit the influence of other great powers, 
notably the US and India. Beijing tends to be intensely suspicious of the designs of 
Washington and New Delhi. Lastly, China is focused on sustaining economic growth in 
China and fears that a slowdown will threaten domestic stability.
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Therefore, US should work with China to formulate sustainable investment standards 
                                           




that are acceptable to both developed and developing countries. The United States and China 
have already tackled the developed versus developing country divide under the United 
Nations Convention on Climate Change. The two nations can apply the same model to 
international development finance. If the United States and China can identify a set of 
common standards that both nations can accept, it is highly likely those standards will be 
acceptable to other nations as well. Washington and Beijing will need to think outside the box 
to find a model that indicates complementarily without requiring complete agreement across 
all parameters. For example, China—or the AIIB secretariat—could issue a lending policy on 
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